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Equal Protection and Lesbian and 
Gay Rights 
Arthur S. Leonard 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution requires the states to afford equal protection of the laws to all 
their residents. Additionally, the Supreme Court interprets the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to impose an identical requirement of equal 
protection on the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment require- 
ment applies to all state and local government entities, including such bodies as 
school districts, public transit authorities, and the like. Thus, American society 
functions under a constitutional mandate to afford equal protection of the laws 
to all residents. 
What does equal protection mean, as a practical matter, for lesbians, gay 
men, and bisexuals? Like all provisions of the Constitution, the guarantee 
acquires meaning in the context of actual cases decided by courts. Court rulings 
on equal protection claims create a complicated construct. of classifications and 
tests that courts customarily use to explain whether a particular policy complies 
with the constitutional requirement. These rulings have only occasionally pro- 
vided protection for gay people, although recent developments suggest a favor- 
able trend. 
To understand this body of law we must recognize that virtually every 
government rule or action may distinguish between different groups of people. 
Not all differential treatment violates the Constitution, or the whole system 
would grind to a halt. For example, Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution as 
adopted in 1789 specify minimum ages for service in the Congress or as 
president, thus discriminating against those under the requisite age. Few would 
argue that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause (embodying the equal 
protection requirement), adopted as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791, should be 
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held to alter or abolish these age requirements on the ground that they deprive 
younger citizens of equal protection of the laws. In this instance, age is used as 
a proxy for maturity and experience that would be recognized by judges as an 
objective difference affecting qualifications to hold office. One could conclude 
that younger people and older people are not "similarly situated" with respect 
to those qualifications relevant to elective office, so it is rational to set an age 
limit. 
Because almost all government policies result in differential treatment, 
courts hold that the normal distinctions stemming from government policies 
comply with equal protection as long as there is a rational basis founded in 
legitimate governmental interests underlying the policy. Governments may 
make distinctions, allocate benefits, and impose burdens that affect different 
people differently without violating the equal protection principle, so long as 
there is some rational justification for the policy.1 As to what constitutes such a 
justification, the Court has ruled that arguments based solely on bias, fear, or 
over broad stereotypes may not be used as a rational basis to sustain legislation, 2 
but justifications based on objective differences may suffice'.3 
Where a government draws distinctions in its treatment of different groups 
in laws or policies adopted through normal lawmaking procedures, the laws or 
policies enjoy a presumption of legitimacy. This means that the government 
incurs no obligation to articulate a justification for discrimination unless a 
challenger first provides convincing proof that no legitimate justification exists. 
For example, in Heller v. Doe (1993), a case in which a state had drawn 
distinctions between people who were mentally retarded and people who were 
mentally ill, the absence of an obvious reason to suspect that the state was 
motivated by prejudice meant that those challenging the policy bore a burden 
to prove that there was no legitimate reason for the policy distinction; only if 
that burden was met would the state incur any burden of justifying its policy. 
It is unusual in law to require somebody to prove a negative, such as the 
absence of a justification, and in earlier cases the Court had spoken as if the 
government was required at least to articulate a plausible justification for 
differential treatment its policies require.4 In Heller, however, the Supreme 
Court made clear that unless the challenger met this initial burden, the govern- 
ment could win without submitting any evidence. Consequently, policies re- 
viewed under the rationality standard are rarely invalidated by the courts. 
However, the courts have recognized that there are circumstances in which 
judicial skepticism is appropriate-when differential treatment involves some 
"fundamental right," grounded in history and tradition, or when a classification 
or distinction used by the government is "suspect" because, under the circum- 
stances, there is reason to believe that the government was motivated by bias 
or prejudice rather than objective, unbiased policy concerns. In such cases, the 
court applies "strict scrutiny" to the government policy, which means that the 
government must prove that the policy is narrowly tailored to achieve a com- 
pelling governmental interest. 
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A court's determination whether a particular policy is subjected to rationality 
review, the more stringent strict scrutiny, or some level of heightened scrutiny 
falling between the two5 can obviously make a big difference in the outcome of 
a case. In a rationality review case, somebody challenging the legitimacy of 
government action bears the burden of persuading the court that the action 
violates the Constitution. Even in such cases, challenges can succeed when the 
only apparent justification for unequal treatment rests on bias or prejudice 
against the disfavored group. But in the absence of such a showing of raw 
prejudice, it is usually crucial that the challenger show at the outset that the 
government's policy affects a "fundamental right" or uses a classification that 
is "suspect." 
Considerable controversy surrounds the methods used by the courts to 
identify such cases, because having passed that threshold, the challenger effec- 
tively shifts to the government the requirement to show that its discriminatory 
policy is objectively justifiable. The government's burden has been held to vary 
depending on the significance of the right at stake or the degree of "sus- 
pectness" adhering to the classification the government is using. For example, 
where the interest is characterized as "fundamental" (such as in voting rights 
cases) or the classification is "suspect" (such as in race cases), the government's 
burden is to show that its policy is justified by a compelling interest and that 
its policy is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest in the way least damaging 
to the fundamental interest or the equality principle. That is, in such cases the 
government must show that there is a "close fit" between its policy and the 
compelling goals the policy seeks to vindicate. 
The Supreme Court has been sparing in identifying fundamental rights, 
although it has not always insisted that they be spelled out in the text of the 
Constitution. One of the problems in synthesizing rules from past decisions 
and attempting to project them forward to new controversies is that almost any 
past decision can be discussed at different levels of specificity or generality. Any 
particular court decision can be narrowly construed to be limited to its particular 
facts, or broadly construed to embody a general principle. Thus, in Loving v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 6 the Supreme Court invalidated under the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses a Virginia statute banning interracial mar- 
riages. One way of reading the Court's opinion would treat it as holding that 
every person has a fundamental right to be free of government interference in 
selecting a marital partner. Because the case involved a man and a woman, 
however, it might be construed at a greater level of specificity as establishing 
that marriage between persons of the opposite sex is a fundamental right. 
· Furthermore, one might view Loving as standing for the proposition that race, 
as a suspect classification, may not be taken into account by the state in its 
determination of who may marry, even if the right to select a marital partner is 
not otherwise deemed fundamental. The Court speaks in its written opinion of 
marriage as fundamental, but it is speaking within the context of a dispute 
involving an opposite-sex couple and at a time (1967) when it was unlikely that 
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anyone on the Court thought their decision created a fundamental right for 
persons to choose marital partners of the same sex; the main portion of the 
opinion focuses on the racial aspect of the case. 
The precedential scope of Loving became critically important when gay 
litigants began in the 1970s to challenge the refusal of states to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples. Courts unanimously refused to find Loving a 
controlling precedent that the right of same-sex couples to marry is fundamen- 
tal.7 Even the Hawaii Supreme Court, which ruled in 1993 that the state had to 
show a compelling interest to justify refusing to issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples, did not use Loving as precedent for finding a federal or state 
constitutional fundamental right to marry.8 Instead, it used an equal protection 
analysis based on the Hawaii Constitution, finding that just as in Loving the 
state violated equal protection by using a race classification in its marriage law, 
in this case the state violated its own state's constitutional equal protection 
requirement by using a sex classification in its marriage law; the Hawaii Consti- 
tution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, explicitly forbids sex discrimination. 
Identifying suspect classifications might begin with the paradigm identified 
by the Court in Loving: race. Beginning with African slavery from early 
days of colonial settlement, there is a long history of racism and attendant 
discrimination in the United States. As a result, racial minority groups have 
historically wielded inadequate political power to protect themselves from dis- 
criminatory government policies through participation in electoral politics, or 
to rely on free market forces to prevent private race-based discrimination 
in jobs, education, housing, or places of public accommodation. Furthermore, 
although one could argue that race is a socially constructed phenomenon, the 
Court has tended to view it as an immutable biological characteristic, perhaps 
reflecting the view that however society constructs the classification of racial 
groups, one's membership in such a group is largely determined by factors 
over which one has no control. These attributes of race, that is, a history of 
discrimination, political powerlessness, and immutability, are frequently recited 
by lower courts as creating a checklist for determining whether other classifica- 
tions are suspect. 
In 1985, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,9 a lawsuit challeng- 
ing a zoning ordinance that erected special barriers to group homes for the 
mentally retarded, the Supreme Court took a somewhat different approach in 
describing how it identifies suspect classifications. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Byron R. White explained that government classifications based on race, alien- 
age, or national origin are deemed suspect because "[t]hese factors are so seldom 
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded 
in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view 
that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. 
For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon recti- 
fied by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will 
be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state in- 
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terest." White did not mention immutability as being significant in this connec- 
tion. 
White then explained that sex classifications call for a "heightened standard 
of review" because sex "generally provides no sensible ground for differential 
treatment." Asserting that "the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation 
to ability to perform or contribute to society" and that sexually discriminatory 
policies "very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men 
and women," he concluded that such a classification "fails unless it is substan- 
tially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest." 
On the other hand, White identified a variety of characteristics that would 
not constitute suspect classifications. For example, intelligence or physical dis- 
ability would not be suspect classifications because they do bear a "relation to 
ability to perform or contribute to society." White asserted that age classifica- 
tions were not suspect because there was no "history of purposeful unequal 
treatment" and no imposition of "unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics" associated with age. Turning to the main issue in the case, the 
Court held that discrimination against the mentally retarded was not suspect, 
observing that this characteristic did bear a relation to the individual's ability to 
perform or contribute to society, and that much legislation on the subject was 
protective rather than discriminatory. Nonetheless, the Court found, using the 
rationality test, that the zoning ordinance in this case was unconstitutional 
because there was no rational justification for treating group homes for the 
mentally retarded differently from other group homes, apart from stereotypical 
fears about mentally retarded people. 
Cleburne illustrates a flexible approach to identifying suspect classes. Rather 
than utilizing a rigid checklist on which a perfect score is necessary, the Court 
emphasized particular items on the list and not others in deciding to apply strict 
or heightened scrutiny to particular classifications. Thus it appears that the 
determination whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification or, to put 
the issue somewhat differently, whether government policies that discriminate 
against lesbians and gay men are subject to strict or heightened scrutiny, is not 
a simple matter of achieving a perfect score on a checklistbased on a comparison 
to race. 
Using the checklist approach, few judges have found that policies discrimi- 
nating on the basis of sexual orientation should be subjected to strict or height- 
ened scrutiny. One judge who has in U.S. Circuit Judge William Norris, who 
concluded that all the race-analogy factors were met by sexual orientation. 
Concurring in Watkins v. United States Army, 10 Norris noted that there is a 
long, well-documented history of antigay prejudice by government and by 
private actors. Sexual orientation frequently bears no relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society. Gays have been saddled with unique disabili- 
ties because of prejudice or inaccurate stereotypes. The trait defining the class, 
in Norris's view, is for all practical purposes immutable, and despite some gains 
in recent years, at the relevant level of national politics for considering military 
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policies, gays lack the ability to defend their interests. (This last point was 
dramatically illustrated by the 1993 battle in Congress over the military policy, 
which culminated in legislative codification of a ban on service by openly 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual individuals.) 11 Using strict scrutiny, Norris found that 
the military policy excluding gays from service was unconstitutional, but the 
majority of the court disposed of the case using a different theory, one not 
based on equal protection. Norris's view is definitely a minority view among 
federal judges who have decided sexual orientation discrimination claims. 
Is sexual orientation a suspect classification when it is used by the govern- 
ment to distinguish between people? One might well go back one step and ask 
whether "sexual orientation" is even a characteristic recognizable for purposes 
of constitutional analysis. Sexual orientation can be defined as a characteristic 
based on the direction of erotic or emotional attraction of an individual; thus, 
everyone who experiences erotic attraction has a sexual orientation, whether 
toward members of the same sex, the opposite sex, or both. A conceptual 
problem emerges, however, as one looks at the myriad cases in which litigants 
sought to attack government policies perceived as discriminating against gay 
people. What exactly are we talking about in such cases, a status (state of being) 
or a classification defined by conduct? 
For example, Colorado's Amendment 2, which was adopted by voters in 1992 
and ultimately declared unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause by 
the Supreme Court in 1996,12 does not on its face use the term "sexual 
orientation." 13 Rather, it speaks of "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orienta- 
tion" when it forbids the adoption or enforcement of any policies "whereby 
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships 
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of 
persons to have or claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status 
or claim of discrimination." Is this a policy that discriminates on the basis of 
"sexual orientation," a status or defining characteristic, or is it, as the state of 
Colorado argued in defending it before the Supreme Court, only concerned 
with behavior? 
In ruling on the constitutionality of a similarly worded city charter amend- 
ment adopted by voters in Cincinnati, Ohio, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that such a policy constituted discrimina- 
tion based on a personal characteristic or status.14 Assuming for purposes of its 
analysis that sexual orientation, as such, is a "characteristic beyond the control 
of the individual" but that lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are to all outward 
appearances indistinguishable from other groups in the population, the court 
said, "the reality remains that no law can successfully be drafted that is calcu- 
lated to burden or penalize, or to benefit or protect, an unidentifiable group or 
class of individuals whose identity is defined by subjective and unapparent 
characteristics such as innate desires, drives, and thoughts." The court asserted 
that in terms of one's relationship with others in society, "homosexual," "les- 
bian," or "bisexual" orientation, as targeted by the Cincinnati policy, was 
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relevant only in the context of behavior that would identify the individual as 
having such an orientation, and thus the policy could discriminate only in 
circumstances when a person's behavior had revealed his or her orientation to 
others. "Those persons having a homosexual 1 orientation' simply do not, as 
such, comprise an identifiable class," argued the court; only those who acted on 
their orientation by engaging in revelatory conduct become identifiable. 
The Sixth Circuit found this argument significant because of the weight it 
attached to Bowers v. Hardwick, 15 in which the Supreme Court ruled that 
"homosexuals" do not have a "fundamental right" to engage in sodomy with 
each other. Interpreting Bowers on a more general level, the Sixth Circuit Court 
characterized it as standing for the proposition that "homosexuals possess no 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual conduct and consequently that 
conduct could be criminalized." From there, it was a short logical step to 
asserting that any conduct that reveals an individual's "homosexual orienta- 
tion" is "homosexual conduct," and because the state can criminalize "homo- 
sexual conduct," a class of people who are identifiable only by the common trait 
of engaging in "homosexual conduct" cannot be a "suspect class" for equal 
protection purposes. The Sixth Circuit's argument was not original; it has been 
a mainstay of federal appellate courts ever since Bowers, most frequently cited 
in cases challenging the refusal of national security agencies or the armed forces 
knowingly to employ lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.16 
The argument depends on several factors for its force, not least of which is 
an expansive reading of Bowers 17 that goes beyond its specific holding. In 
Bowers, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that homosexuals engaging 
in specific conduct outlawed by a Georgia statute (anal or oral sex) were within 
the sphere of privacy the Court had previously identified with respect to birth 
control and abortion. The Sixth Circuit broadened the precedential scope of 
Bowers to all "homosexual conduct" and then labeled "homosexual conduct" 
any conduct by which a person reveals his or her orientation as homosexual, 
lesbian, or bisexual, when it asserted that heightened scrutiny could not be 
applied to a classification that was based on criminally proscribable conduct. 
However, the way individuals become identifiable as lesbians, gay men, or 
bisexuals is not invariably by engaging in criminally proscribable conduct, but 
rather by speaking, engaging in nonsexual social intercourse, and associating 
themselves with others. Nothing in Bowers v. Hardwick suggests that any state 
could proscribe engaging in nonsexual expressive conduct that identifies one as 
gay, yet in most cases it seems likely that it is exactly such conduct, not 
engaging in anal or oral intercourse with a partner of the same sex, that renders 
somebody an identifiable member of the class of lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people.18 
The Sixth Circuit's approach bears striking similarity to the courts' analytical 
approach in cases challenging the military exclusionary policy. Under the cur- 
rent version of this policy, 19 Congress asserts that the "presence in the armed 
forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homo- 
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sexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, 
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military 
capability." Based on this legislative finding, Congress commands that members 
be separated from the service if they engage in, attempt to engage in, or solicit 
another to engage in homosexual acts (unless the member proves that he or she 
is not really homosexual, i.e., somebody who normally desires to engage in 
such acts), if they state that they are homosexual or bisexual (unless they prove 
that despite this statement they have not engaged in homosexual acts and have 
no propensity to do so), or if they attempt to marry a person of the same sex. 
Challengers of this policy assert that it is a status-targeted policy. If Congress 
fears that homosexual conduct will disrupt good order and morale, why is it 
willing to tolerate the retention of individuals who engage in such conduct if 
they can demonstrate that they are not really "homosexuals"? Clearly, Con- 
gress is trying to rid the armed services of people who have a homosexual, 
lesbian, or bisexual orientation by mandating the discharge of any member 
whose nonheterosexual orientation comes to light as a result of any conduct, 
including expressive conduct or speech. The service member is not discharged 
because of the conduct or speech, as such, but rather because of what the speech 
indicates about the individual's status. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
first explained this distinction in BenShalom v. Marsh, 20 decided under the pre- 
1994 policy, when it rejected a First Amendment free speech argument by a 
service member whose discharge was based solely on her statement that she 
was a lesbian.P 
The Defense Department responds that the policy has everything to do with 
conduct and no particular concern with status, except as status bears predictive 
value toward conduct. Its argument is that under Bowers the Defense Depart- 
ment is constitutionally entitled to proscribe homosexual conduct, but its main 
concern is with maintaining good order and morale necessary to an efficient 
fighting force. The department contends that the occurrence of homosexual 
conduct in the military will be detrimental to its mission; thus its main concern 
in any particular case is to determine whether the individual is likely to engage 
in such conduct. Anything revealing a "propensity" to engage in homosexual 
conduct, including a statement that one is gay, is deemed relevant for this 
purpose. Such speech may identify the speaker as a member of a class defined 
by sexual orientation 22 or it may identify the speaker as a person with a 
propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, a class defined by conduct. The 
Defense Department argues that it is concerned only with the latter; thus if the 
speaker can convince the department that his or her speech does not indicate 
such a propensity, the department will retain him or her in the service. By 
contrast, the military member who can persuade the Defense Department 
that despite his or her homosexual activity he or she is not a "homosexual" 
theoretically does not present a threat to the military mission, because he or 
she lacks the "propensity" to engage in such conduct in the future. 
The level of judicial scrutiny given to Amendment 2, the Cincinnati charter 
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amendment, or the military policy depends on whether fundamental rights or 
suspect classifications are involved. When courts are considering Amendment 2 
or the military policy, are they considering a status classification issue or a 
behavioral classification issue? Is there a meaningful distinction between the 
two? Should it make a difference for purposes of equal protection? Is Bowers 
dispositive, as most federal courts of appeals have insisted, in rejecting equal 
protection claims brought by lesbian and gay litigants? 
It is possible that government policies may vary with respect to the type of 
classifications they create. There may be times when classifications or distinc- 
tions are based solely on status, others in which behavior is the central concern, 
and finally those in which status and behavior are conflated so that it is difficult 
to disaggregate them. An example of this problem is the criminal prohibition of 
sodomy, an issue the Supreme Court analyzed in Bowers using the privacy 
doctrine that has evolved under the Due Process Clause but which, as Justice 
John Paul Stevens observed in dissent, also presented a serious equal protection 
issue. 
Michael Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that 
makes oral or anal sex a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison. 
The statute does not distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex conduct. 
Hardwick was a gay man who was arrested in his bedroom while having oral 
sex with another man. His lawsuit was joined by a married heterosexual couple, 
who alleged that the statute violated their right to engage in oral or anal sex. 
The lower courts held that the heterosexual couple lacked "standing" (i.e., the 
requisite personal interest in the outcome) to challenge the law, because Georgia 
was not actively enforcing the law against married couples. A federal appeals 
court ruled that unless the state could show a compelling interest justifying the 
law, it would violate Hardwick's right of privacy, a fundamental right. The state 
appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court framed the question as whether the constitutional right 
of privacy might prevent the state from making it a crime for homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy. According to Justice White, the question was thus restricted 
because Michael Hardwick, as a gay man, was limited tocontesting the applica- 
tion of the law to him. At oral argument, counsel for the state conceded that it 
would be unconstitutional to prosecute a married couple under this statute. The 
Court held, by a vote of five to four, that the right of homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy did not "resemble" other kinds of conduct previously held to come 
within the right of privacy, and dismissed Hardwick's challenge. 
Dissenting, Justice Stevens argued that the Court had failed to address a 
significant equal protection issue. If, as seemed likely, the Court would hold 
that Georgia could not prosecute heterosexuals for engaging in sodomy in 
private, then there was discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. While 
the sodomy law was apparently aimed at conduct, the status of those engaging 
in the conduct would become crucial in a determination of whether it was 
prohibited. The historical factors on which the Court relied in determining that 
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homosexuals lack a right to engage in sodomy did not support the discrimina- 
tory result of the Court's decision, because the sources cited by the Court all 
involved absolute, across-the-board prohibitions on sodomous conduct, regard- 
less of the genders of participants. (The English sodomy law from which Ameri- 
can sodomy laws initially derived, for example, outlawed all anal intercourse 
and disregarded lesbianism, and biblical precedents are not gender-specific.) 
When the Court found that a fundamental right of privacy did not apply to 
Hardwick's case, it evaluated the sodomy law using rationality review, because 
the Due Process Clause requires that all government policies that restrict 
personal freedom must at least be found to serve some legitimate state interest. 
The Court concluded that the presumed moral judgment of Georgians that 
homosexual sodomy should be forbidden was sufficient justification. Stevens 
pointed out that Georgians had never made such a judgment, as all Georgia laws 
forbidding sodomy had been gender-neutral and made no sex-based distinctions. 
Georgia never presented any rationale for forbidding homosexuals from engag- 
ing in conduct that was, apparently, constitutionally protected when engaged in 
by heterosexuals. The Court's opinion makes no response to Stevens's argu- 
ment. 
Was Bowers about conduct, status, or both? In an amicus brief filed with the 
Bowers Court, which has recently taken on notoriety due to its citation and 
quotation by lower federal courts denying gay equal protection claims, 23 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund argued that "the 'regulation of same 
sex behavior constitutes the total prohibition of an entire way of life' because 
homosexuality is inexorably intertwined with 'homosexual conduct.' "24 Ex- 
pressing agreement with this view, the circuit court in Steffan v. Perry25 
held that the Defense Department, permitted by Bowers to forbid homosexual 
conduct, could rationally presume that any person identifying himself or herself 
as gay or lesbian was, in effect, admitting a "propensity" to engage in homosex- 
ual conduct. 
Does the conflation of conduct and status mean, in the wake of Bowers, that 
claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation must inevitably be 
dealt with using the relatively undemanding rationality test, as the circuit 
courts in the Cincinnati and Steffan cases suggest? Or, to the contrary, are 
the basic purposes of equal protection and due process so different that it is 
inappropriate for a court to look to Bowers as a precedent when evaluating a 
statute for compliance with equal protection? The Court's recent decision in 
Romer v. Evans did not address this question but implicitly raised doubts about 
the continued viability of Bowers as a precedent. 
In Romer, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 violated 
equal protection because of its discriminatory treatment of a fundamental 
right of political participation. By removing the subject of antidiscrimination 
protection for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from the normal process of 
legislative and executive policy making, argued the plaintiffs in that case, the 
state had discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. Because part~cipation 
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in the normal political process is a fundamental right, they argued, the state's 
discriminatory policy was subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection. The 
Supreme Court agreed that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional but did not 
directly embrace the Colorado court's fundamental rights analysis, preferring 
to analyze the measure as categorically discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, evaluating the similarly worded Cincin- 
nati ordinance, found that the city had several rational bases for withdrawing 
authority from the city government to forbid discrimination against gay men, 
lesbians, and bisexuals.26 According to the court, the measure "encouraged 
enhanced associational liberty" by allowing individuals to refrain from associat- 
ing with homosexuals; returned the city to a "position of neutrality" on the 
controversial issue of homosexuality; "reduced governmental regulation of the 
private social and economic conduct of Cincinnati residents" and thus "aug- 
mented the degree of personal autonomy and collective popular sovereignty 
legally permitted concerning deeply personal choices and beliefs which are 
necessarily imbued with questions of individual conscience, private religious 
convictions, and other profoundly personal and deeply fundamental moral is- 
sues"; and saved the city the expense of enforcing nondiscrimination policies. 
In sum, the court found that preserving the right of its residents to discriminate 
against homosexuals was a legitimate concern of the city of Cincinnati, making 
rational its decision to disempower its government from forbidding such dis- 
crimination. After deciding Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court vacated the 
Sixth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. 
Romer may signal an important development in equal protection doctrine 
and its application to governmental antigay discrimination. Although the Court 
never directly addressed either the question whether sexual orientation should 
be treated as a suspect classification or the question of what precedential weight 
Bowers should be given in an equal protection case, the Court's analysis of 
Amendment 2 did settle some important issues. 
First, Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion for the Court implicitly rejected 
the Sixth Circuit's assertion that persons having a homosexual orientation could 
not constitute an "identifiable class." Kennedy implicitly rejected the attempt 
to conflate behavior and status. By focusing exclusively on status, Kennedy 
avoided having to mention or deal with Bowers. After Romer, the argument 
that gay people are not a constitutionally cognizable class for equal protection 
purposes is dead. 
Second, Kennedy's basis for holding Amendment 2 unconstitutional was his 
· determination that the various justifications advanced by Colorado in its de- 
fense were pretexts for animus against homosexuals. Kennedy characterized 
Amendment 2 as having singled out homosexuals as virtual "strangers to the 
law" by categorically depriving them of any redress against discriminatory 
treatment by the state. The justifications offered for Amendment 2 seemed 
so disproportionately trivial in comparison to this extraordinary breadth of 
discrimination as to be blatantly pretextual. Kennedy asserted that animus 
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against homosexuals could not, by itself, be a legitimate justification for a 
discriminatory policy. 
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia asserted the inconsistency of this result 
with Bowers, which premised approval of outlawing homosexual sodomy solely 
on the presumed majoritarian moral disapproval of homosexuality. How could 
moral disapproval be sufficient to sustain criminal penalties imposed solely on 
homosexuals, while insufficient to sustain the apparently lesser deprivation of 
making it more difficult for homosexuals than for others to obtain redress for 
discriminatory state policies? 
The Court's subsequent action vacating the Sixth Circuit's decision in the 
Cincinnati case and sending the matter back to the lower court for reconsidera- 
tion appears to confirm this interpretation of Kennedy's opinion. Although the 
Court did not directly address whether sexual orientation is a suspect classifica- 
tion or specify that antigay measures are subject to heightened or strict scrutiny 
by the courts, it has established the beginnings of a new framework for analyz- 
ing equal protection claims by homosexual litigants. Policies that discriminate 
against homosexuals may be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, and 
animus against homosexuals will not serve as an adequate sole justification to 
sustain discriminatory policies. 
Whether this methodology will serve to strike down the current military 
policy or bans against same-sex marriage has yet to be determined. In both of 
those cases, the government will attempt to articulate justifications apart from 
simple animus and may well succeed in convincing courts that the requirements 
of Romer have been met. As we observed earlier, a Supreme Court decision 
may have different meanings depending on the level of generality at which it is 
described. Romer might be seen as sui generis, a case narrowly confined to the 
extraordinarily offensive measure it invalidated. On the other hand, Romer's 
apparent contradiction of some of the reasoning of Bowers holds out hope that 
future equal protection challenges to antigay government policies may fall on 
more fertile soul. 
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